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RECENT DECISIONS
COMMERCIAL LAW -PROVISION IN STOP PAYMENT
ORDER RELEASING BANK FROM LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
Depositor signed a stop payment order containing a provision
constituting a release of the bank from all liability if the bank pays
the check through "inadvertence." Held (5-1): Such provision is
against public policy. Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton,
Pa. 101 A. 2d 910 (1954).
The uniform course of decision is that where there is a stop
payment without a purported release the bank will be held liable
if it inadvertently pays the holder. The theory is that since the
check does not operate as an assignment pro tanto of the depositor's
funds, the order to pay is merely executory and may be counter-
manded at any time. American Defense Society v. Sherman Nat.
Bank, 225 N. Y. 506, 122 N. E. 695 (1919); Elliott v. Worcester
Trust Co., 189 Mass. 542, 75 N. E. 94 (1905) ; NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW § 325. However, there has been an attempt by banks
to escape liability through the insertion of purported releases.
The effect of these releases have resulted in a split of author-
ity. The majority of states hold such a release to be effective.
Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929);
Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920) ;
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488
(1932). However, in an early New York case such a purported
release was construed to be a mere statement by the bank that it
would not be liable unless it failed to exercise ordinary care. Elder
v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 25 Misc. 716, 55 N. Y. S. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
The questions of consideration or the public policy regarding the
release were not discussed but it reflected that "The courts are
not prone to construe instruments in such a way as to support a
waiver of liability for negligence." Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank,
supra at 719, 55 N. Y. Supp. at 578. See: Mynard v. Syracuse, etc.,
Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 180 (1877) (a case involving an attempt by
a common carrier to avoid responsibility by stipulation). New
York has also found such a release ineffective for want of consid-
eration and as against public policy. Levine v. Bank of U. S., 132
Misc. 130, 229 N. Y. Supp. 108 (1928). But a Massachusetts
court, in Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, supra, held such a release
not against public policy and found consideration for the stop
payment order in the "mercantile relation of the parties." New
York, in Gaita v. Windsor Bank, supra, which relied on the Tremont
case though not discussing public policy or consideration, talked
of "freedom of contract" and found that a depositor could issue
either a limited or qualified notice not to pay or an absolute and
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unqualified notice. If he issued the former, the bank would be
relieved of liability, but if the latter the bank would be held to its
common law obligation. It noted that if the bank did not wish to
assume its common law liability it may terminate its relationship
with the depositor. However, a number of cases have found such
a provision to be ineffective to escape liability due to a lack of
consideration or, as in the instant case, a public policy against such
a release. Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79
N. E. 2d 119 (1948) (though a "mercantile relationship" existed,
there was no consideration and a public policy against it);
Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926)
(statute declares such a provision against public policy); Rein-
hardt v. Clifton Passaic Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 16 N. J. 430, 84
A. 2d 741 (1951) (relied on lack of consideration); Calamita v.
Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. 2d 46 (1949) (provi-
sion found to be absolute and positive notice and without consid-
eration).
It is to be noted that in the instant case the issue was not
complicated by the question of consideration because the order
contained the language of the Uniform Written Obligations Act
of 1927, 33 P. S. § 6, stating that: "The undersigned agrees to be
legally bound hereby." But the majority found such a release to
be against public policy analogizing a bank to a common carrier or
public utility. They also mention Sections 4-103 (1) and 4-407
of the Uniform Commercial Code, though not yet effective has been
enacted in Pennsylvania, which forbids a bank to disclaim or limit
their liability for negligence and give the bank the right of subro-
gation against the payee. The sole dissenter, following Tremont
Trust Co. v. Burack, supra, and Gaita v. Windsor Bank, supra,
finds a release due to the notice being limited and qualified and
that since these releases "... relate exclusively to personal and
private affairs" that no public interest is involved.
It is submitted in the light of the fact that the bank is not
subrogated to the drawer's rights against the payee they should
be able to limit their liability by contract. However, since there
is a strong public policy averse to limitations on liability for negli-
gence, the proposal of the Uniform Commercial Code, apparently
relied on in the instant case, prohibiting such limitation and
allowing subrogation seems just and equitable.
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